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Knowledge of Our Own Beliefs1
SHERRILYN ROUSH
King’s College London
There is a widespread view that in order to be rational we must mostly know what we believe. In the
probabilistic tradition this is defended by arguments that a person who failed to have this knowledge
would be vulnerable to sure loss, or probabilistically incoherent. I argue that even gross failure to know
one’s own beliefs need not expose one to sure loss, and does not if we follow a generalization of the stan-
dard bridge principle between first-order and second-order beliefs. This makes it possible for a subject to
use probabilistic decision theory to manage in a rational way cases of potential failure of this self-knowl-
edge, as we find in implicit bias. Through such cases I argue that it is possible for uncertainty about what
our beliefs are to be not only rationally permissible but advantageous.
Must we have more or less accurate beliefs about our beliefs? Many otherwise diverse
thinkers have taken this to be a requirement for rational beings (e.g., Brandom 1994,
2000, Davidson 1984, Moran 2001, Savage 1972, Sellars 1963, Shoemaker 1994, 1996,
Williams 2004). In the tradition that defines rationality by means of the axioms of proba-
bility the reason for this view is arguments to the effect that a subject who either failed
to be certain that he had a degree of belief he did have, or failed to have a degree of
belief he was certain he had, would be vulnerable to sure loss. That is, there is a set of
bets that such a subject would accept as fair and that would give him a loss no matter
how the events he bet on turned out. This kind of vulnerability, which the word “inco-
herence”2 will refer to here, is according to this tradition what rationality protects us
from. I will argue here that contrary to two entrenched arguments for this view sure loss
does not follow from failure to have accurate beliefs about our own beliefs. Mistaken
belief about one’s own belief is a failure, but it is a lack of knowledge and not a failure
of rationality in the sense expressed by the probability axioms. If a rational being needs
reasonably good knowledge of her own beliefs, we will need more than the constraint of
probabilistic coherence to explain why.
1 Thanks to audiences at Carnegie Mellon University, the Rutgers Epistemology Conference, the Berkeley-
London Graduate Philosophy Conference, the London School of Economics, and King’s College London
for helpful criticism and discussion. Thanks in particular to Teddy Seidenfeld, Glen Shafer, Philip Dawid,
Nick Shea, and Matt Parrott.
2 Usage of this word varies between vulnerability to sure loss and violation of the axioms, two concepts
that are largely extensionally equivalent but that can come apart depending on how sure loss is defined.
One can violate the axioms and, arguably, not have the relevant vulnerability (Hacking 1967), and here
the issue will be whether having not violated the axioms you can be vulnerable to sure loss by not hav-
ing your higher- and lower-order beliefs in sync.
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Perfect knowledge of our beliefs is one way of achieving coherence when we have
higher- and lower-order beliefs, but that by itself gives us no guidance about how to
minimize the damage if we are not perfect. One might think that of all frameworks the
probabilistic system should be able to tell us how to manage this situation because it
is designed to tell us how to be rational in circumstances of incomplete information
and uncertainty. But if probabilistic rationality requires perfect knowledge of our beliefs
then there is no rational way to manage violation of the requirement. Thus in arguing
that coherence does not require self-knowledge of belief, I make room for the welcome
possibility that probabilistic decision theory can be brought to bear for weighing our
options in light of possible ignorance of our beliefs. My arguments show more specifi-
cally how to use that framework, by identifying a bridge principle between higher- and
lower-order beliefs, which I call “No Gratuitous Interference” (NGI), the following of
which completely protects a subject against sure loss if she does have inaccurate beliefs
about her beliefs, and thus preserves rationality in the sense discussed here. The stan-
dard bridge principle on this topic, known as “Self-Respect” (SR), protects those with
perfect self-knowledge but does not protect the imperfect. Since NGI is a generalization
of SR, this new principle is suitable for angels as well as humans, and advisable for
those who do not know which they are. We will see further that uncertainty about
what our beliefs are is not only rationally permissible, but also can be advantageous,
as for example in cases of potential implicit bias.
1. Is ignorance of our belief states even possible?
It might seem as if there should be no dispute over the claim that we are sometimes
wrong, or can be wrong, about what we believe or how strongly we believe it. Like the
number of pigs in Allegheny County, that I have a particular degree of belief in a propo-
sition is a state of the world and a contingent fact. It could have been otherwise than it
is, and surely could be otherwise for all I know. The mere fact that I possess the belief
does not automatically give me knowledge of it. It does not follow from my possessing a
book that I know that I possess that book. If it did then I would either have a much more
powerful mind or a much smaller storage unit than I do. I might clearly remember being
tempted to buy that book, but not now be sure whether I did or not. I might clearly
remember owning that book at one time, but be unable to remember whether I gave it
away in the meantime. What is special about the case of belief that makes many people
think that if I own a belief I must know that I own it?
The answer may be that there is something special about minds. To extend the book
metaphor, it is rather as if, like a person who can’t afford the local real estate, the mind
lives in its storage unit with all of the boxes open. If a mind wants to know what beliefs
it possesses it has only to turn the light on and rummage around a little. Thus some say
that while being wrong about past or future beliefs makes sense, in the same way that
being wrong about other peoples’ beliefs makes sense, surely I here now could not be
wrong about what I here now believe, at least not if I have a mind. I cannot directly see
what books or beliefs were here yesterday, though I might know by some other means,
but I can see what books and beliefs are and are not here right now. If it is not immedi-
ately obvious then I can just ask myself, and dig around a bit.
You could ask yourself, and your answer could be wrong. Empirical psychology sup-
ports the common impression that we know our current mental states better than our past
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ones, and in many cases know our own mental states better than those of others, and we
obviously do know quite enough about our current mental states to get around in the
world in daily life, making plans on the basis of expectations about our behavior that
depend on our own current beliefs and desires. However, we also have dark corners.
Even we who do not regard ourselves as racist or sexist, who would never assent to the
claim that minorities or women are by that fact less qualified, can be exposed through
experiments to have implicit bias, for example through our overchoosing some job candi-
dates’ resumes over others with no distinction in the profiles except racial association of
the name. (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004)
If willingness to act on p is any part of what it is to believe p, which I think it is, then
such studies give evidence that we were wrong when we claimed we did not have racist
beliefs. It is not that a past self—the one who disavowed racism—was wrong about what
a later self—the one undergoing the psychology experiment—believed. There is no rea-
son to suppose the belief changed over that time. It merely took time to collect evidence
about what was a stable disposition throughout the story. Thus, one surely can be mis-
taken about one’s current beliefs, and there can be evidence of it. If the mind were to be
master of its own house, its house would have to be as small, inert, and indifferent as a
storage unit, and, for good and ill, most minds do not meet these criteria.3
If it is conceptually possible to be wrong about one’s own belief states then we should
not take sincere assertion of p as a perfect indicator that one believes p, but we do not.
This is easy to see through familiar scenarios that end with the statement “You don’t
really believe that.” Imagine a man charged with racketeering, and guilty of it, who has
nevertheless successfully avoided his wife ever witnessing anything illegal. Under interro-
gation the wife quite correctly asserts that she has never seen anything out of order, and
quite sincerely asserts that her husband is just a businessman. The astute detective smells
weakness, though, stares into her eyes, and says of her summary statement “You don’t
really believe that, do you?” She does not want to believe that something is wrong, and
does not have evidence that she can specify for believing something is wrong, which
together explain her sincere assertion. But she also does not—“deep down” we say—
actually believe her husband is just a businessman. Things make her suspect otherwise
though she cannot put her finger on why. It may be that all cases of sincere assertion
without belief involve self-deception, but that would not support an argument that they
are impossible.
Whether it is possible to be wrong about one’s belief states depends of course on what
beliefs are. If degree of belief in q is strength of a feeling one has about q, then that
would set us up to know what our degrees of belief are, provided feelings are intro-
spectable. Historically, some have thought that looking inward on oneself was not only a
source of knowledge but even infallible, but we do not need to assume infallibility in
order to understand the logic of this view. The idea is that it is the mind that possesses
the feeling, and surely to feel q is sufficient for feeling that one feels q. Maybe the second-
order feeling is not precise, but how can a mind have a feeling it is not able to become
3 The non-technical views cited above that take accurate beliefs about our beliefs as required for rationality
can accommodate violations as pathologies. However, that interpretation becomes strained in the case of
implicit bias because if what empirical psychology suggests is right then bias in our judgment is perva-
sive across both subject matters and people. Thus, although morally problematic it would be statistically
normal.
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aware of or sense? How could it have a feeling it could not feel? Here the intuition
comes not so much from a picture of the mind as it did above, but from what feelings
are supposed to be. Whatever they are, feelings, hence beliefs, are not like books. The
mind does not know one of them by rummaging around and lighting on an object. This
view would also explain the widespread impression that one has access to one’s own
beliefs of a sort that others do not have, access that has a quality of immediacy. It is easy
to see these claims supporting a picture in which having beliefs at all involves having
accurate beliefs about those beliefs. How could there be a belief, that is, a feeling, there
if the mind that has it did not sense it?
Like many probabilists, I follow Frank Ramsey (Ramsey 1926, Armendt 2006) in
rejecting the definition of a degree of belief as a feeling, because it is insufficient for
acknowledging the causal efficacy that beliefs have on our behavior. Rather, it is part
of what belief is that it disposes one to act. Indeed on the Ramsey view having a
degree of belief in q is fully identified with being disposed to act as if q is true with a
risk of gaining and losing things of value to one that is proportional to that degree;
one is disposed to put something at stake on q vs. not-q. To discover what one’s
degree of belief is in q by self-inspection would involve not asking oneself how lively
q feels, nor asking whether one would sincerely assert q, but asking oneself to what
extent one would be willing to act on one’s confidence in q.4
But asking oneself questions, or verbal behavior generally, would not be the only way
to investigate what one’s degree of belief is. More tangible behavior putting something at
risk if q is false is another kind of evidence. No finite set of either kind of evidence will
imply that one has a given degree of belief, since a disposition is a regularity of response
toward all possible opportunities (that are relevant, or likely, or similar to the actual
world, or some such qualifier), but if beliefs are dispositions to act then it is possible in
any given case for evidence from tangible behavior to be a more reliable indication of
one’s degrees of belief than evidence coming from conversations with oneself. This view
of belief makes good sense of the impression that the experiments showing implicit bias
are uncovering something about our beliefs. Whatever we may say about our beliefs,
deciding among job candidates can be more revealing of those mental states because in
such decisions we stand to benefit or lose a good bit depending on whether we are right
or wrong about who is most competent. So we act on the basis of what we really think.5
Though Leonard Savage also thought of degree of belief as a state of mind that mani-
fested itself in extraverbal behavior, he regarded the answer the subject gives to the
hypothetical question how he would bet or act as “just the right one” for “the theory’s
more normative interpretation as a set of criteria for us to apply to our own decisions”
(Savage 1972, 27–30). This is to take it as a norm of rationality that your actual degree
of belief (thus betting odds) coincide with what you think it is, and is partly based on the
4 There are several kinds of attempted analyses of the notion of degree of belief appropriate for probability.
These, including Ramsey’s, are outlined and their flaws discussed in Eriksson and Hajek (2007), who go
on to argue convincingly both that flawed analyses can have explanatory value and that we have every
right and reason to take the concept of degree of belief as an epistemological primitive.
5 Verbal behavior is of course also action; it can put valuable things at risk, even tangible things, and that
positive or negative utility figures in the calculation of the most advantageous behavior overall. Being
taken by others as unbiased on the basis of one’s testimony to that effect will often have positive utility
and if that utility has a greater absolute value for the subject than the negative utility of not hiring the
most competent person, then implicit, that is, disavowed, bias, could be advantageous overall.
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sure-loss arguments discussed below. But the view is not pertinent to the current discus-
sion of whether being wrong about one’s degrees of belief is possible. Savage most defi-
nitely thought it was, and that since reports of how one would bet can differ from one’s
actual dispositions to bet, the interrogation about hypothetical behavior was ‘a compro-
mise between economy and rigor’ on the empirical question what a subject’s degree of
belief actually is (Savage 1972, 27–30).
Savage observed these distinctions but the normative claim that a subject should know
what his beliefs are is often conflated with the descriptive claim that he always does via
the metaphor of announcement of odds. This accounts for the frequent response on the
part of probabilistically well-educated philosophers to the idea that we might not have
perfect knowledge of our beliefs that begins with a blank stare and continues: You’ve
just announced your odds! How could you not know what they are? First, having odds
does not require announcing them, but second, in the context of odds, announcing is
ambiguous between reporting and doing. It is verbal behavior, but the image suggests
there is an audience ready to accept those bets. If so, then one who has posted odds is
not merely reporting how he thinks he would bet; he is on the hook. But this identifies
what we say about our beliefs with what is true of them only by equivocation.
Even if announcement of odds compels actual betting, and even though actual betting
is often better evidence for one’s disposition to bet than merely telling yourself how you
would bet, being on the hook on an occasion is not the very same thing as your disposi-
tion to bet. You might have made an announcement incompetently relative to your dispo-
sitions by making a mistake in the math associated with the stakes in a particular game,
or accidentally before you had finished the math. Your actual betting behavior arises out
of your dispositions to bet, in conjunction with circumstances and opportunities, but it is
not the same thing.
Once we have the idea of a degree of belief as a disposition to act, the possibility of
being wrong about our beliefs is easy to comprehend. If it is hard to imagine a belief
whose owner does not believe he has it, it is not hard to imagine a disposition to act that
a person does not believe he has. More than once in human history a sincere belief that
“I would never do that” has been followed sooner or later by the person doing just that.
In some cases the disposition will have changed in the meantime between report and act,
but it need not; it is enough if the conditions changed in such a way as to activate an
existing disposition unknown to the subject. We can imagine others having been in a
position to predict the behavior the subject did not expect of himself. As a disposition to
act, a belief becomes more analogous to an intention. We seem to find it easy to see
when others are not aware of their real intentions, and we have probably all been in situa-
tions where it was natural to speak of not knowing whether our own intentions were
good.
The Ramsey view makes it natural to classify implicit bias as a case of (degree
of) belief, because what makes a belief a belief on this view is its potential to affect
the subject’s actions, and the view has no requirement that she have conscious access
to or voluntary control over this disposition. A person who believes she does not
have racist beliefs would naturally tend also to attest that she would never disadvan-
tage a minority in her decision-making during hiring. On the Ramseyan view, if she
is wrong about her disposition to act—as the empirical evidence suggests most of us
are—then she is wrong about her belief. There is a tendency in the literature to iden-
tify implicit bias as alief (Gendler 2008), an automatic or habitual belief-like attitude,
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particularly one disconsonant with one’s explicit avowals, but on this definition of
alief there is no inconsistency in classifying it also as a Ramseyan belief, because the
latter view has no requirement that the disposition to act be responsive to reasons or
easily changed.6 This is important because it allows for the possibility of using proba-
bilistic decision theory to manage the difficult situation implicit bias puts us in. In
that framework probabilities are beliefs, so if an alief is not a belief then the frame-
work is not available for those cases.7
For Ramsey the picture of a bettor and a bookie looking to score was merely a color-
ful metaphor. Empirical evidence of one’s dispositions to act can come from any action.
The usefulness of the metaphor comes from the fact that every action in which something
is at stake can be represented as a gamble. In crossing streets I bet my life that cars can-
not move at the speed of light, and, more mundanely, that I’ve looked in the right direc-
tion for the country I’m in. These kinds of bets are made without announcements or
reports, but we still stand to gain or lose depending on our actions.8 Thus even though
not all dispositions to act are dispositions to lay down money with a bookie, we can
imagine them as dispositions to bet, and thereby imagine behavioral evidence about a
subject’s degree of belief in q taking the form of actual betting on q. This simplifies the
theoretical discussion, and the quantitative representation is an efficient way to make
qualitative comparisons. A bet at odds of x: 1–x on q would be taken as evidence that
the subject has odds of x:1–x, that is, degree of belief x in q.
In the subjective probabilistic view of rationality, rational degrees of belief obey the
probability axioms, so the fact that such a subject has degree of belief x in q is expressed by
“P(q) = x” where P is the subject’s personal probability function P. These probabilities are
possessions of the subject, hence are called “subjective”, but an internalist picture is not
mandated by this use of probability if we adopt the Ramseyan view of belief. As noted
above, a subject may or may not have introspective access to what a given degree of belief
of hers is because it is possible to have difficulty becoming aware of one’s own dispositions
to act. A non-extreme degree of belief expresses uncertainty without the subject needing an
attitude at all about what her uncertainty is. She may or may not have second-order degrees
of belief expressing claims about the first-order degrees of belief, but if she does she need
not have introspective access to them either. Notably, she can and commonly does show her
appreciation that one claim, q, supports another, p, by revising her degree of belief in p
6 Some cases of alief will qualify as incoherent when described as Ramseyan degrees of belief. If for
example you are willing to bet the same amount of money on each of two glasses you have seen be filled
with sugar and water, on their being safe to drink, but are reluctant to drink one of the glasses and not
the other, because of a label “sodium cyanide” that you affixed to it yourself, then you are disposed to
bet with two different sets of odds on the same proposition. But it does not seem inappropriate to classify
such an alief as irrational.
7 A sticking point in representing an alief as a belief will be whether the state is an attitude toward a speci-
fic propositional content or its intentionality is more diffusely distributed. I tend to agree with Mandel-
baum (2013) that the state must have propositional content if it is to do the explanatory work that has
been expected of it.
8 Some resist the betting interpretation of these acts, with the idea that it would be crazy to bet one’s life
on an empirical proposition. In fact we do it every day, and we are startled at the idea because we nor-
mally suppress awareness of it, in the way a person who re-locates to an earthquake-prone area and wor-
ries about it eventually stops thinking about the risk. Once awareness arises it is common to either
suppress it again or else realize that this kind of bet is not taken in isolation. If I never bet my life on
matters like cars not traveling the speed of light, I would never cross the street or go anywhere at all.
For most people that would not be a life worth having, so the beliefs and utilities are in balance.
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accordingly (e.g., by conditionalization), and without beliefs about that support relation or
about her beliefs.9 In this the framework stands in marked contrast to philosophers who
argue for metaknowledge of our beliefs on the basis of a claim that rational belief revision
requires us to have knowledge of our beliefs (e.g., Davidson 1984, Williams 2004: 208,
Shoemaker 1994: 281–286, 1996: 33–34).
In fact many of the founding fathers of the probabilistic rationality view were quite
opposed to the intrusion of higher-order probabilities or beliefs. These were perceived to
be philosophically suspect and mathematical trouble, and it is unclear which was the cart
and which was the horse in their arguments.10 Whether higher-order probabilities are legiti-
mate or need to be reigned in, there is no difficulty representing them since the claim that
the value of a probability function is x is itself a proposition and so can fall within the
domain of one or more probability functions. Thus, if a rational subject does have a degree
of belief about her own first-order degree of belief, then her second-order degree of belief
y in her having first-order degree of belief x in q can be expressed by a second-order prob-
ability: P(P(q) = x) = y. She has degree of belief y that she has degree of belief x in q.
For the question of this paper we need to imagine behavioral betting evidence of the sub-
ject’s degree of belief about her degree of belief in q, but it is easy to see what form this
must take. Evidence of her degree of belief about her degree of belief in q would take the
form of her bets concerning how she would bet on q. The conceptual possibility of being
wrong about one’s own degrees of belief is thus secured by the fact that she could lose the
bet about how she would bet on q, by betting differently on q than she bet that she would.
One might think that this possibility is idle since there would be no way to settle the
bet she made about how she would bet on q. The only behavioral way to investigate
whether she was right about this would be to ask her to bet on q, and this behavior
would not be probative because we could not rule out the possibility that this second bet
was strategic. She might have bet what she did on q just in order to win her previous bet
on what she would bet on q. If she were smart wouldn’t she always do that?
We cannot expect the evidence for our dispositions (degrees of belief) to be infallible
whether it comes from behavioral manifestations or introspective conversations. However,
we can take steps to address the possibility of strategic betting in the operational proce-
dure described for verification. We can make the reward for getting it right about q much
higher than the reward for getting it right about the way she would bet about q, and the
reward for the latter small. This reward structure gives her the incentive to bet at the
first-order, that is, on q, in accord with the degree of belief she really has in q (Skyrms
1980). Since she got no new evidence about q between the two bets, we can assume that
the degree of belief she manifests in the second bet is also the one she had when she bet
about what her degree of belief in q was.
How can the Ramseyan picture explain the impression that our knowledge of our own
beliefs is better and more immediate than our knowledge of others’ beliefs or their
knowledge of ours? Introspection is immediate in some sense and can only be done on
oneself, so the existence of such an ability would explain the intuitions of asymmetry
9 Dispositions corresponding to a conditional probability are needed in order for the subject to carry out
conditionalization, but those do not amount to beliefs about the support relation. First, a conditional prob-
ability is not the probability of a conditional (Lewis 1976), and second, in the standard axiomatization
conditional probabilities are equal to ratios of unconditional probabilities and are not some further thing
beyond these parts.
10 See Skyrms (1980) for a survey of and responses to their objections.
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between the types of access the 1st and 3rd person have to information about belief states.
This asymmetry of access could also provide some explanation of why we typically
know more about our own beliefs than others do.
The Ramseyan view does not require introspective access but the existence of intro-
spective evidence for belief is not incompatible with the view that a belief is a disposi-
tion to act. What would be incompatible is a claim that introspection and sincere
assertion are the only kinds of evidence. The Ramseyan view of belief gives the means
to tell a fuller story. It is possible that at least some of our knowledge of our own
mental states, including our dispositions to act, is gained in the same manner as our
knowledge of others’ mental states—via behavioral data, our observations of our own
actions. This view is supported by a good deal of current cognitive science (Carruthers
2011), and the view that this is our primary way of knowing our own minds goes back
at least as far as Gilbert Ryle (Ryle 1949: 155–156).
Whenever we do use behavioral evidence to know our own minds, an asymmetry in our
knowledge of beliefs is introduced by the fact that in our own case we have a lot more
empirical evidence. With the exception of conjoined twins, a human being spends more
time in her own company than she does with any other individual. She thus has anywhere
from more to vastly more behavioral evidence about herself than about any other individ-
ual, and than any other individual has about her. The felt immediacy of our knowledge of
our mental states, when that feeling exists, might come from the fact that we do not need
to be consciously thinking about our behavior in order to be registering or processing infor-
mation about it, and that at any given time most of our behavioral evidence about our-
selves will already have been processed, and our conclusions ready to hand or even
entrenched. Thus Ramsey’s view of belief allows us to add a type of evidence that we
might have about our beliefs, and that might even contribute to explaining 1st- and 3rd-per-
son asymmetry, without requiring us to deny that there is introspective evidence.
Just as the possibility of self-deception does not imply that we are pervasively self-
deceived, the possibility of inaccurate beliefs about one’s beliefs does not imply that we
are typically, grossly, or pervasively wrong about them. We are evidently not, as noted
above, since we effectively anticipate and plan many of our actions. The upshot of the
conceptual possibility of error about some of our beliefs is support for the view that our
accuracy about our beliefs in ordinary contexts is a contingent fact, not a necessary con-
sequence of having beliefs at all.
2. Is ignorance of one’s own belief states compatible with rationality? The Direct
Argument
To admit that blindness about some of our beliefs is conceptually and psychologically pos-
sible, is not to concede that such ignorance is compatible with being a rational subject, and
the latter is usually the point at issue when the possibility of self-blindness about one’s
beliefs is denied. I will focus here on a way of asserting this claim in probabilistic terms,
and two ways of defending the claim that get little discussion in print because they are
widely taken to be a settled matter, obvious to anyone sufficiently trained to follow a two-
step and a four-step argument about betting. I will argue that both of these arguments are
invalid, and propose an alternative, systematic, way of handling uncertain and not fully
accurate beliefs about our beliefs that avoids sure loss and has recognizable and compelling
intuitive interpretations.
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The natural way for a probabilist to define knowledge of one’s own belief states is
through the following conditions:
For every q for which the subject has some level of credence x,
either P(P(q) = x) = 1 or P(P(q) = x) = 0 and Confidence
if P(P(q) = x) = 1 then P(q) = x; Accuracy
Confidence says that if one has some degree of belief x in q, then one is certain that one’s
degree of belief in q is x or certain that it isn’t. Accuracy says that if one is certain that one’s
degree of belief in q is x then indeed it is x. I will call these two conditions together “Self-
Transparency” (ST).11,12,13
Soshichi Uchii (1973) argued that addition of these conditions to the probability
axioms yields the natural extension of the probabilistic conception of rationality to the
second-order, that is, to degrees of belief about degrees of belief, or probabilities of prob-
abilities, via a sure-loss argument that is repeated regularly and reflexively today.
To show vulnerability to sure loss we must show that there is a set of bets that the
subject regards as fair and that would give her a loss no matter how the questions she
bet on turned out. In the sure-loss argument for ST we have a subject whose probability
function is P, and who has degree of belief x in q. The statement that she has this degree
of belief, P(q) = x, is the proposition we imagine her betting on, call it B. That is, we
imagine her having a degree of belief, z, about whether x is her degree of belief in q,
and z is her probability for the proposition P(q) = x; we write this statement P(P
(q) = x) = z, and now P(B) = z. Her gains when B is true and false are as usual, with S
the stake:
B true B false
S - zS - zS
One way for the subject to violate self-transparency is for P(q) = x to be true while she
is not certain of it. That is, z < 1 and B is true. Now suppose the stake is -1. Her net
11 This is a minimal property of knowledge, in which the subject’s degrees of belief merely correspond to the
facts. It lacks the additional robustness that epistemologists generally recognize as necessary for knowledge,
which might come from justifiedness, or reliability, or tracking, or virtue. The minimal notion is sufficient
for the purpose here, since if having this property toward one’s degrees of belief is not necessary for rational-
ity then a strictly stronger property is not either.
12 In these stipulations knowledge of one’s beliefs is defined as infallible and perfectly precise, but in reject-
ing ST, infallibility and over-precision are not my targets. (Cf. Williamson 2000.) Using the new princi-
ple introduced below, NGI, a subject can protect herself from sure loss no matter the level of inaccuracy
she has about her beliefs. The point here is not that she be allowed imprecision, but that failure to know
what her beliefs are is not per se a failure that compromises her rationality. I address the perfect proper-
ties because the sure loss argument looks strong enough to defend even them.
13 One could define self-knowledge using two different probability functions, instead of one function
applied to itself as in ST. One of the two functions would play the higher-order role, the other represent-
ing degrees of belief at the first order. However, that might be similar enough to one subject having
degrees of belief about another subject’s degrees of belief that inaccuracies would escape incoherence in
a similar way; there does not seem to be any intuitive reason to think that being mistaken about someone
else’s beliefs makes us irrational. I use one probability function applied to itself because this is prima
facie the most likely to produce incoherence when there is any misalignment between the two orders. For
some problems and solutions for self-referential probability functions see Caie (2013), and Campbell-
Moore (2015a, 2015b).
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gain if B is true is S - zS, which is -1 + z < 0. Her net gain if B is false is z > 0. But
B is not going to be false because it is a statement of this subject’s degree of belief in q
and that is x by assumption. Thus, the subject whose probability function is P does not
have a chance at the gain in the column where B is false. If the stake on the bet on P
(q) = x is negative, then the subject for whom P(q) = r but who is uncertain that P
(q) = r is sure to suffer a loss of x1.
The other way for the subject to violate ST is for her to be certain that P(q) is x when
it is not. I.e., z = 1 and B is false. In this case, take a positive stake, S = 1. If B is true,
then she has a gain of 1  z = 0, and if B is false then she has a loss of z. But this sub-
ject’s degrees of belief about q insure that B is false, so she can only lose. This subject
is sure to suffer a loss of z.
This argument shows that for a subject with probability function P who violates Self-
Transparency there is a set of bets that she would accept that would give her a loss in all
possible worlds in which her probability function is P. It is a result that should not sur-
prise us, since restricting the set of worlds of evaluation to those in which she has this
probability function is effectively treating the fact that she has these degrees of belief as
a necessary truth. A subject will be susceptible to sure loss if she bets even a penny
against a necessary truth.
As I have stressed, that a subject has a particular degree of belief is a contingent truth.
Two plus two could not have been five, but our subject’s degree of belief in q could
have been different than it actually is, and, as we implicitly grant by imagining this bet-
ting scenario, it could actually be different from x for all she knows. The fact that what
her degree of belief is in q is settled at the stage of our betting scenario does not change
this. Even if a coin is already tossed, it is still sensible to bet on two possible outcomes,
as long as the result of the toss remains concealed.14 The fact that we the theorists may
legitimately assume we know what the subject’s probability function is does not imply
that the subject knows. One way to justify the claim that the subject knows what her
probability function is would be to assume that she must know in order to be a rational
subject at all, but of course that would be begging the question at issue here.
Substituting a concealed coin toss for her degree of belief in the sure-loss argument
above brings out the invalidity of that argument. In the substitution the analog to her
having degree of belief x in q is the coin coming up, say, heads, H, and the analogs of
violating Self-Transparency are being uncertain that the coin came up heads when it did,
and being certain that it came up heads when it did not, i.e., the two ways of being most
extremely wrong about H. If we assume that the coin indeed came up heads, H, and that
this has been concealed from the subject, and as above that her probability function is P,
the sure-loss argument above becomes:
One way for the subject to be wrong about whether it came up heads is for H to be true
while she is not certain of it. That is, z < 1 and H is true. Now suppose the stake is -1.
Her net gain if H is true is S – zS, which is -1 + z < 0. Her net gain if H is false is
z > 0. But H is not going to be false because it is a statement of the outcome of the coin
toss, and that is H by assumption. Thus, the subject whose probability function is P does
not have a chance at the gain in the column where H is false. If the stake on the bet on
H is negative, then the subject for whom H is true but who is uncertain that H is sure to
suffer a loss z  1.
14 Thanks to Joe Ramsey for suggesting this comparison.
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Necessarily, if an outcome is settled, then a subject who bet anything against that out-
come will lose something, but vulnerability to sure loss requires the existence of a set of
stakes that will make you lose in all possible outcomes. If you have a false belief about
the outcome of the coin toss, a bookie who knows the outcome of the toss could exploit
your ignorance for his gain, but this loss is due to a lack of knowledge, not a failure of
rationality, on your part.
To establish a sure-loss vulnerability in the foregoing way in a subject who is not
Self-Transparent, it has to be not just true that P(q) = x, but true in all possible worlds
relevant to the evaluation. P(q) = x is a contingent matter, so, like H, its actually being
true does not imply there are no possible worlds in which it is false. Why did we only
count as relevant those worlds in which P(q) = x is true? It is standard procedure when
evaluating the subject’s fate in betting that one only evaluates worlds in which she has
the degrees of belief, i.e., probability function, that she actually has. Here the subject
actually has degree of belief x in q, so we take it she has this in every world relevant to
the evaluation. The reason for this procedure is that her probability function determines
the odds she is willing to accept, and we are trying to determine what fate those disposi-
tions to bet will bring her, not what would happen if she had some other dispositions.
However, this rationale for the standard procedure supports a different procedure in
the second-order case. The set of relevant possible worlds should indeed be ones where
she has the odds she uses in the actual world for the questions she is betting on. When
she bets on q, the odds she is willing to accept are determined by the value of P(q), but
when she bets on whether or not P(q) = x, her odds are determined by a different part of
the function P, namely, by the value of P(P(q) = x). The rationale that tells us that when
she bets on q we should consider only worlds in which P(q) = x implies that when she
bets on P(q) = x we should consider only worlds in which P(P(q) = x) equals its actual
value, but it gives no reason to restrict the outcome-worlds for the second-order bet to
those worlds in which P(q) = x.
Indeed, if we do hold P(q) = x fixed, that is, true in all worlds relevant to the evalua-
tion, when we evaluate how the subject fares in betting on P(q) = x, we are not treating
P(q) = x as an outcome or random variable, a proposition for which more than one value
is possible, in this case the values true and false. If so, then we are not treating it as
something that could be bet on, so the Uchii argument is not a betting argument, not a
sure-loss argument for Self-Transparency, at all.
In the subjective interpretation of probability, that P(q) = x is a random variable is
equivalent to its being possible that the subject does not know whether her degree of belief
in q is x. A random variable can be thought of as a proposition whose probability value is
subject to variations due to randomness. What this randomness consists in depends on the
interpretation of probability. For example, if one has a propensity interpretation, then the
randomness is the chance involved in the set-up for an experiment, e.g. with dice. On the
subjective interpretation of probability, it is the subjective randomness that results from
incomplete knowledge of a quantity; it is epistemic uncertainty. There is no question that
in the current context we are using a subjective interpretation, and therefore allowing or
denying that P(H) = x is a random variable is equivalent to allowing or denying it as pos-
sible that the subject does not know the outcome, here does not know what her belief is.
In not treating P(H) = x as a random variable, the Direct Argument begs the question.
In treating worlds in which the subject has a different degree of belief from her actual
one as irrelevant, the Direct Argument is either inconsistent with the subjective interpreta-
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tion of probability—because it is assuming that epistemic uncertainty is not sufficient to
make a variable random—or else it is begging the question of whether the subject could
be rational without knowing what her beliefs are—by assuming the subject has no uncer-
tainty or error about what her degree of belief is.
One might try replacing the Direct Argument with a denial that P(q) = x could even
be an outcome or random variable, but one would need an argument for this that
addresses the fact that whether one has a particular degree of belief or not is a contingent
matter. Sure loss arguments can be made against a subject who fails to be certain of logi-
cal truths or who is willing to stake something on a logical falsehood, but what justifies
this is that the content of the proposition is a necessary truth.15 No possible world in
which the necessary truth is false is relevant because none exist. Since there are possible
worlds in which the subject has a different degree of belief than the one she actually has,
the burden is on one arguing for Self-Transparency to explain why we should treat her
having a given degree of belief as necessary. It is a necessary truth relative to the sub-
ject’s probability function, but resting an argument on that buys nothing. Her probability
function as a whole could also have been otherwise.
Holding P(q) fixed when evaluating the subject’s bet on q, and letting it vary when
she is betting on the proposition P(q) = x will be enforced simply by treating the bets on
q and the bets on P(q) = x as having different sets of relevant possible worlds. Evaluat-
ing the first-order and second-order parts of the subject’s probability function thus differ-
ently may seem suspect since in evaluating coherence we want to know whether a
person’s degrees of belief fit together properly, and surely coherence of a whole function
cannot be evaluated a piece at a time.
It is true that evaluating the coherence of a proper subset of a particular subject’s
degrees of belief is not enough to conclude that the subject is coherent, and evaluating
each of an exhaustive set of subsets will not address whether they are coherent with each
other. However, these are not what we are doing. Our question here is whether failure of
transparency at the second-order about one’s beliefs at the first order introduces
incoherence, so we are entitled to assume that the first-order degrees of belief of the sub-
ject are coherent. In fact we must assume the subject is coherent at the first order in order
to isolate our question. If we can see that inaccurate or uncertain second-order degrees of
belief do not necessarily introduce incoherence into an otherwise coherent subject, then
we will have certified the possibility of coherence of such a subject’s entire set of proba-
bilities, not just a subset of them, and not just subsets of them piecemeal but as a whole.
With this understanding, we are imagining a subject betting with the second-order part
of her function on what the values of the first-order part of her function are, with the
assumption that the first-order part of her function is coherent, but no further assumptions
about the particular values its arguments take. She fails Self-Transparency if she lacks
Confidence or Accuracy about even one of her degrees of belief, that is, about proposi-
tions of the form P(q) = x. We ask whether a failure of this sort yields a sure loss. The
sure loss argument above fails, for the same reason that taking its analog in the concealed
coin toss situation as a sure loss would be a misinterpretation. If, in the first way of fail-
15 Even this is dubious since the randomness of a random variable in the subjective interpretation is sup-
posed to be epistemic uncertainty, and propositions whose content is logically necessary can still be epis-
temically uncertain. The probabilistic conception of rationality is prima facie limited to requiring logical
omniscience, a problem beyond the scope of this paper.
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ing Self-Transparency, P(q) = x is true but P(P(q) = x) 6¼ 1, then a negative stake is the
only way to argue for a sure loss, but it does not yield a sure loss. In one of the possible
outcomes, namely where P(q) 6¼ x, the subject gains z > 0. If her bet against P(q) = x
corresponded to a degree of belief in P(q) 6¼ x that was greater than 0, then she wins
something. That non-actual world in which P(q) 6¼ x and she wins something for betting
even a penny in its favor is among the possible worlds relevant to the evaluation. An
analogous point holds for the failure of Accuracy.
The view I am advocating has a number of virtues. Intuitively, the difference between
the Direct Argument and the correction I am proposing is that the former is posed from
the theorist’s point of view, whereas I set up the betting from the point of view of the
subject. The latter, but not the former, is in keeping with the subjective interpretation of
probability, as noted previously concerning random variables, and with the whole point
of the conception of rationality based on subjective probability, that the subject not be
judged on the basis of whether her contingent beliefs are true or objectively probable.
This is why it makes sense at all for her to be judged not on whether she loses in the
actual world, but whether she could lose in all possible worlds. When we judge her by
coherence we find that the subject will actually lose, other things equal, if she does not
know what her degrees of belief are, but she will not necessarily lose. This distinction
may seem idle, but we will see below that it is not if her questions about what to believe
about her beliefs are embedded in a larger context of questions she faces.
3. Self-Transparency and Self-Respect: The Indirect Argument
Though the direct sure-loss argument for Self-Transparency fails, there is a bridge princi-
ple that immediately implies the Accuracy direction of ST, and for which a sure-loss
argument has also been proposed. This is
P(q/P(q) = x) = x Self-Respect (SR)
called “Self-Respect” by David Christensen (2007), and a two-function version of which
was dubbed “Miller’s Principle” by Brian Skyrms (1980). I will sometimes refer to this
as the “10th-Character Principle” since it requires on the right hand side a re-inscription
of whatever is in the 10th-character position, counting from the left, an answer that the
subject can give without first investigating how the world is. SR says that your degree of
belief in H given that your degree of belief in H is x, should be x. We could paraphrase
it: that your degree of belief is x is not a reason for it to be some other value.
SR is not trivially true. For example it does not say that if your degree of belief in q
is x then your degree of belief in q is x. It does not follow from the probability axioms
alone because it is a bridge principle between the orders and the axioms are within-order
constraints that only impose relations between orders at extreme probability values.
Notice also that SR does not mention or depend on what the subject’s degree of belief in
q actually is. The conditional probability can be written out as a ratio:
P(q/P(q) = x) = P(q.P(q) = x)jP(P(q)=x)
in which the expression “P(q) = x” never occurs naked, but only as an argument of the
function P. This means that the principle makes stipulations on the basis not of what
your degree of belief in q actually is but on what you think it is. It says that your suppos-
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ing that your degree of belief in q is x does not give grounds for it to be some other
value.
Assuming coherence, SR implies the Accuracy condition above because
P(P(q) = x) = 1 and
P(q/P(q) = x) = x
together imply
P(q) = x
Confidence and Accuracy together imply SR, as shown by Sobel (1987, 69–70) and more
simply by Christensen (2007, 325–326). Notably, SR alone does not imply Confidence.16
SR is the synchronic instance of Bas van Fraassen’s (1984) Reflection Principle, so Reflec-
tion presupposes and implies Accuracy about one’s current beliefs. The principle has been
popular: Koons (1992, 23) takes a version of SR to be a “virtually undeniable principle . . .
of rationality”, van Fraassen takes the synchronic instance of Reflection as “I should think,
uncontroversial” (van Fraassen 1995, 19), and Vickers (2000, 160) refers to SR as “a well-
known principle of epistemic logic”.
SR or variations of it have played a key role in arguments illustrating the usefulness of
second-order probabilities, and the logically stronger ST has played that role in arguments
urging their triviality. For example, a version of SR with different functions at the two orders
allowed Skyrms to show that the content of what we learn in a Jeffrey conditionalization
can be understood as a second-order disjunction of statements of the degrees of belief that
changed in the learning, because second-order strict conditionalization on such a disjunction
is equivalent to first-order Jeffrey conditionalization. Haim Gaifman used a two-function ver-
sion of SR as an axiom to construct a theory of higher-order probability (Gaifman 1986).
On the other side, Self-Transparency makes all of the second-order unconditional proba-
bilities equal to zero or one, thus making them irrelevant to every other proposition, and so,
it is assumed, idle, unable to effect any changes in the probabilities of other propositions.17
ST is thus a perfect shield from the perceived trouble of second-order probabilities since it
acknowledges the existence of the application of functions to propositions about their values
that is licensed by the probability representation, while (apparently) rendering any hierar-
chies thus expressed ineffectual and innocuous. Thus, whether we should take it as a
requirement that the value of P(q/P(q) = x) be x, and if so why, is a matter of some interest
independently of the question whether we must have knowledge of our beliefs in order to
be rational.
16 Assume SR. Without loss of generality suppose that the only possible values for P(H) are x and y, and sup-
pose P(H) = x. By total probability, P(H) = P(H/P(H) = x)P(P(H) = x) + P(H/P(H) = y)P(P(H) = y).
Under our assumptions, it follows that x = xP(P(H) = x) + yP(P(H) = y); to preserve coherence it is suffi-
cient that P(P(H) = y)|P(P(H) = x) = x|y. It is not required that P(P(H) = x)) = 1. This means that the Indi-
rect Argument for SR, even if successful, cannot serve as a full argument for ST.
17 The Savage-Woodbury “collapse” argument (Savage 1972, 58–59) that since any statement of second-order
probability can be reduced to a first-order statement it is thereby trivial or epiphenomenal, does not, or need
not, assume SR. It depends only on the fact that total probability relates the first- and second-order thus:
P(H) = P(H/P(H) = x) P(P(H) = x)) + P(H/P(H) 6¼ x)P(P(H 6¼ x)), which does not imply SR (or the
weaker RSR defined below). The collapse argument does not assume or imply ST and is not intended to. Its
target is the attempted use of higher-order probability to represent imprecise credence.
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Skyrms seems to regard his version of Self-Respect as a useful idealization, having
even provided a counterexample to it (Skyrms 1980, 125). While I think there can be no
quarrel that various versions of this principle are valuable for simplifying a representation
and isolating questions of interest, many have regarded SR as a requirement of rationality, on
the basis of an argument that violating it makes a subject vulnerable to sure loss. If that argu-
ment succeeds then coherence implies SR, which implies Accuracy, so coherence requires
Accuracy at least, but I will argue that the sure-loss argument fails.
The substance of this sure loss argument has been discussed in illuminating ways and
in different forms by Christensen (2007), and Briggs (2009), both of them pointing out
ways in which the sure loss that is secured by it is weaker than the usual conclusion. I will
go further to argue that there is a generalization of SR that avoids sure loss vulnerabilities
entirely, even for the subject who fails Self-Transparency, even if the failure is extreme.
Here I present the sure-loss argument in the style that followers of Savage will recog-
nize. Taking
H: The coin lands heads.
G: P(H) = x
we suppose that
P(H/P(H)=x) = y for some y [ x,
that is, that the subject violates SR, and
P(P(H)=x) = z[ 0;
that is, that the subject allows it as at least possible that the condition P(H) = x is fulfilled.18
To represent a conditional probability in betting terms we use a called-off bet. For the
conditional probability P(H/G), the bet concerning H will only be in force if G holds. If
G does not hold then the bets involving H are off. In our case G is P(H) = x. That is, G
is the claim that the subject’s degree of belief in H is x. The subject has odds on both H
and P(H) = x, but the bet the conditional probability tells us he makes on H is called off
if the other matter he has odds on, P(H) = x, turns out false.
To see how the commitments expressed in our assumptions might turn out for the sub-
ject, we write a table with columns for all of the possible outcomes and with stakes, bn.
H(x) is 1 if H is true, and 0 if H is false, and similarly for G(x), which is 1 if P(H) = x
and 0 if P(H) 6¼ x.
Outcomes H and G -H and G -G
G(ω)b1(H(ω) – y) b1(1–y) -b1y 0
b2(G(ω) – z) b2(1–z) b2(1–z) -b2z
Total each outcome
18 I represent the subject’s beliefs as probabilities rather than merely as credences because I am assuming
they conform to the axioms, and are coherent until some specific assumption about the subject makes
them otherwise.
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There are only three outcome columns because in case G is false the bet on the coin is
called off, so it does not matter whether H is true or false. With the proposition P(H) = x
represented as “G”, this looks like an ordinary situation. But here G is a statement of proba-
bility, hence a statement of the subject’s betting odds on H. This statement will be true in
the first two sets of possible worlds, and in those worlds the odds G indicates will contribute
to the subject’s wins and losses. In those worlds, in addition to being willing to bet at odds
y:1y on H, she is also willing to bet at odds x:1x on H. That commitment must be listed
in the table along with the other odds, yielding:
Outcomes H and P(H) = x -H and P(H) = x P(H) ≠ x
b3(H(ω) – x) b3(1–x) -b3x
G(ω)b1(H(ω) – y) b1(1–y) -b1y 0
b2(G(ω) – z) b2(1–z) b2(1–z) -b2z
Total each outcome b3(1–x)+ b1(1–y)+ b2(1–
z)
-b3x+ -b1y+ b2(1–z) -b2z
Accepting two different sets of odds on the same proposition can come to no good. Fol-
lowing Teddy Seidenfeld, who endorses this argument fully and thinks that Savage had it in
mind as obvious, we can see the subject described by this table as vulnerable to loss in all pos-
sible outcome-worlds, if we assign values 1, (yx)/2, and -1 to the stakes b1, b2, and b3
respectively. This gives a negative payoff in every column, as calculated in the final row
below.
Outcomes H and P(H) = x -H and P(H) = x P(H) ≠ x
b3(H(ω) – x) b3(1–x) -b3x
G(ω)b1(H(ω) – y) b1(1–y) -b1y 0
b2(G(ω) – z) b2(1–z) b2(1–z) -b2z
Total each outcome x–y + (y–x)(1–z)/2 x–y + (y–x)(1–z)/2 (x–y)z/2 
x-y is negative, 1z is no more than 1, and (yx)/2 < yx, so the first two outcomes
both have losses under this assignment. xy < 0 and z > 0, so the third outcome is also a
loss. Thus there are stakes at which in every relevant possible world the subject loses. An
analogous argument can be made for y < x, z > 0.
How does an argument style that did not work to defend ST, work to defend something
that implies it? We saw that what undermined the sure loss arguments concerning the
unconditional probabilities, P(H) = x and P(P(H)=x) = 1 was that the non-actual worlds in
which P(H) did not equal x—and the subject who was uncertain that it was x might win—
exist and had to be counted among the relevant possible worlds if the subject’s having a
particular degree of belief was to be treated as a random variable. The conditional bet by
its structure (apparently) removes those worlds from the set of relevant possibilities. The
possible worlds in which the subject who has odds on H that are not equal to x could win
or break even, also happen to be worlds in which the conditional bet is called off.
Neat as this is, the previous table is misleading in listing the bet on H at odds x:1x
on a par with the other bets, for while the odds implied by our assumptions:
P(H/P(H) ¼ xÞ ¼ y for some y[ x;
P(P(H)=x) = z [ 0;
describe actual dispositions of the subject, neither of these assumptions nor their con-
junction determines an actual value for P(H). Nothing in our assumptions allows us
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to say more about the odds x:1x than that it is possible that the subject has them.
Thus, their difference in status from the odds listed in the left column needs to be
flagged more prominently.
In addition, though the subject does not have a commitment to odds of x on
H in the worlds of the third and fourth columns, she does have some commitment
or other about H in each of those worlds; we will call those odds u:1u. Finally,
the subject also has some value or other for P(H/P(H) 6¼x) in every possible world, and that
must be registered in the table to see the full picture. It is a disposition with regard to the
conditional bet that is complementary to the conditional bet in our original assumptions,
the probability of H on the catch-all, that is, on the assumption that P(H) is something
other than x. We can see via total probability that lack of a value for this term is why
our two assumptions do not determine an actual value for P(H):
P(H) = P(H/P(H)=x)P(P(H)=x) + P(H/P(H) 6¼ xÞP(P(H) 6¼ x)
If we assume SR, then P(H/P(H)=x) = x for all x, and that determines the value of P(H/P
(H)=u) for all u not equal to a specified x; the value is u. However, we were supposed to
be arguing for SR, not assuming it. Our assumption that P(H/P(H)=x) = y > x does not
determine the value of P(H/P(H) 6¼x)—other things equal, likelihoods are independent of
each other—so we will record this catch-all likelihood explicitly in the table in order to
make plain that as far as we know it can take any value. The odds corresponding to this
conditional probability we represent in general as v:1v.
With these implicit terms spelled out, the table for a subject adhering to SR looks as
follows.
Outcomes H and P(H) = x -H and P(H) = x H and P(H)= u ≠ 
x
-H and P(H)=u ≠ 
x
b3(1–x) -b3x b3(1–u), 
etc.
-b3u, etc.
Actual odds ↓
(1-
G(ω))b4(H(ω) –
u)
0 0 b4(1–u) -b4u
G(ω)b1(H(ω) –
x)
b1(1–x) -b1x 0 0
b2(G(ω) – z) b2(1–z) b2(1–z) - b2z - b2z
Total each 
outcome
(b3 + b1)(1–x)+ 
b2(1–z)
-(b3 + b1)x  + 
b2(1–z)
(b3 + b4)(1–u) –
b2z
-(b3+ b4)u – b2z
Because this subject is following SR, the variable v in the first-row, third-column outcome
world has become u. In none of the worlds indicated by the columns does the subject have
more than one set of odds on H, or anything else, so no coefficients will lead to loss in all of
the possible worlds represented.
However SR does not protect us from all trouble. The following conditions are com-
patible with those that were used to define the SR table:
1. P(H) = x
2. P(P(H) = x)) = 1
3. P(PR(H/P(H) = x) = y) = 1, y 6¼ x, and
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4. P(P(H) = x)) = 1 ⇒ P(PR(P(H) = x) = 1) = 1
where “PR” designates an objective probability function. Under these conditions the out-
comes row showing the properties defining each possible world would have four more
columns, and most saliently here, in half of those columns where it now has “P(H) = x”,
it would also have “PR(H) = y”. If so, then for the subject with G(x)b1(H(x) – x) =
b1(1x), that is, for whom P(H/P(H) = x) = x, there exist possible worlds in which she
is willing to bet on H at odds x:1x despite the fact, in that world, that the objective
probability of H is y. It is no irrationality to have one’s degree of belief fail to match
the objective probability—that is mere ignorance—but this particular failure is one the
subject could have avoided because 1–4 imply that she is also certain that the objective
probability of H is y. I will call this situation awkward.
We will avoid awkward questions in the current context by imposing a proviso
that will remove such cases from the scope of the principle, thus:
P(H/P(H)=x) = x provided no statement or set of statements of probability
(other than P(H) = x) for which P has a value is (possibly
together with P(H) = x) probabilistically relevant to H.19,20
Call this “Restricted Self-Respect” (RSR). (Cf. Roush 2009, 253.) A subject following
this principle is safe against sure loss since SR is safe and this is SR over a restricted
domain. It tells her to follow the 10th character when there are no relevant probability
statements that she has values for that could imply that the properties of the outcome-
worlds are different from or in tension with what the condition P(H) = x in the condi-
tional probability P(H/P(H) = x) designates them to be.21 Analogously to SR, RSR
implies a version of the Accuracy property—Accuracy qualified by the proviso—so the
shift to RSR does not undermine but only qualifies the Indirect Argument.
However this does not imply that following SR or RSR is the only way to avoid incoher-
ence. The more explicit table allows us to see that there is another safe way for a subject to
accept a value for P(H/P(H) = x). Imagine that she has a policy of regarding the mere claim
19 Note that this refers to probability statements, such as “P(H) = x” or “PR(H/P(H) = x)” that themselves
have probability values. The function P also assigns values to statements such as H, but those first-order
statements need not be disqualified by the proviso. The probabilities for all first-order propositions rele-
vant to H should be taken into account in the value we give to P(H/P(H)), just as the probabilities for all
same-order propositions relevant to A should be taken into account when evaluating P(A/B).
20 Note that the paradoxical type of proposition treated by Caie (2013), where H is equivalent to P(H) ≥ .5,
is ruled out by this proviso, since the equivalence makes P(H) ≥ .5 relevant to H, and the subject has a
value for P(P(H) ≥ .5).
21 The counterexamples to SR given in Skyrms (1980), Christensen (2007, 2010), Roush (2009), and Laso-
nen-Aarnio (2015) all appeal to suppositions relevant to the relation of the subject’s beliefs to the
world—optimism, drug consumption, empirical psychological evidence of unreliability, angel communi-
cations. They can be represented in the form of conditions 1–4 because those suppositions must be mat-
ters the subject has degrees of belief in if she is to be expected to take them into account. They are thus
not counterexamples to RSR. A principle that handles such cases coherently without awkwardness when
P(H) = x and PR(H/P(H) = x) = y are in the condition of the conditional probability is Cal: P(q/(P(q) = x
and PR(q/P(q)=x)=y) = y (Roush 2009). A principle that handles the cases where 1–4 are in the back-
ground is: RSR when the proviso is fulfilled and P(q/P(q)=x) = y when conditions 1–4 are in the back-
ground, and are the only relevant statements of probability in the background. Analogous principles can
be formulated for NGI below. These points can be seen by recognizing that what I call awkwardness here
is a violation of the Principal Principle. See Roush (2009, 252–257).
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that she has a particular degree of belief in H as irrelevant to whether H is true. Thus, which-
ever possible world she might be in, and for all x, her disposition toward P(H/P(H)=x) is
just the same as her disposition toward H, whatever the disposition toward H is in that
world. She would be following a strategy of regarding a mere statement about what her
belief in H is as irrelevant to what her belief in H should be.22 This is expressed by the fol-
lowing alternative principle to RSR:
P(H/P(H)=x) = P(H) provided no statement or set of statements of
probability (other than P(H) = x) for which P has a
value is (possibly together with P(H) = x)
probabilistically relevant to H.
Call this “No Gratuitous Interference” (NGI), and the same principle without the pro-
viso “No Interference” (NI). RSR, analogously to SR, can be justified by saying that
merely being confident that I have a given degree of belief in H is not a reason to
have a different degree of belief in H. NGI follows the thought that merely being con-
fident that I have a given degree of belief in H is also not by itself a reason to have
that degree of belief in H. If I am a (probabilistically) rational subject then I have
(probabilistic) reasons for whatever degree of belief I do have in H, but that I have
that degree of belief in H is not all by itself a reason, at least not in general. As above
with RSR, the proviso captures the intuitive idea that the principle applies only when
the claim that the subject has a given degree of belief alone is under consideration.
NGI, like RSR, is not awkward, but a subject following NI can be awkward for the
same reason that one following SR can be: statements of probability can in conjunction
with other statements of probability be probabilistically relevant to the properties of the
relevant outcome worlds.
That a subject following NGI is not vulnerable to sure loss can be seen by writing out
the table for the answers she gives:
Outcomes H and P(H) = x -H and P(H) = x H and P(H)= u ≠ 
x
-H and P(H)=u ≠ 
x
“b3(H(ω) – x)”
b3(1–x)
“b3(H(ω) – x)”  
-b3x
“b3(H(ω) –u)”
b3(1 – u)
“b3(H(ω) – u)”
-b3u
Actual odds ↓
(1-
G(ω))b4(H(ω) –
P(H))
0 0 b4(1–P(H)) -b4P(H)
G(ω)b1(H(ω) –
P(H))
b1(1-P(H)) -b1P(H) 0 0
b2(G(ω) – z) b2(1–z) b2(1–z) - b2z - b2z
Total each 
outcome
b3(1–x) + b1(1–x)
+ b2(1–z)
-b3x – b1x+ 
b2(1–z)
(b3  + b4)(1–u) –
b2z
-(b3 + b4)u – b2z
22 Note that there would be no more psychological difficulty in following this principle than there would for RSR
since it substitutes for the ability to count ten characters the equally basic ability to recognize the syntactic differ-
ence between “H” and “P(H)=x” or the verbal difference between “H” and “I believe that H”. Both RSR and
NGI would also require the subject who applies them to recognize whether the proviso is fulfilled, but while that
cannot be guaranteed, often the matter will not be mysterious. It is a question of whether you have degrees of
beliefs about whether or not something is interfering with your belief’s relationship to the truth.
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There is no world in which the subject has more than one set of odds on H, but here
it is not because the subject’s value for P(H/P(H) = x) is always whatever the 10th
character in that expression is, but because the subject’s value for that expression
is always whatever her value for P(H) happens to be. In the worlds of the first two
outcome columns that is x. In the worlds of the third and fourth outcome columns
that is u.
The reason the 10th-Character Principle works for those subjects for whom it does
preserve coherence—the Accurate subjects—is that these subjects never discharge the
condition P(H) = x, i.e., become certain that P(H) = x, unless P(H) does equal x. RSR is
thus a special case of NGI.23 Following the 10th-Character Principle will make anyone who
does not actually have accurate beliefs about her beliefs vulnerable to sure loss, but the
imperfect subject can avoid this entirely, regardless of the degree of her ignorance about her
belief state, by following NGI. Any subject can avoid sure loss by following NGI, but,
unlike SR and RSR, NGI does not imply any version of the Accuracy property. Thus the
Indirect Argument for Accuracy fails.
Since NGI imposes an irrelevance between the first- and second-orders it may seem
like a new way of making second-order probabilities idle, to put alongside the way that
ST appears to do so by making their values extreme, and so probabilistically irrelevant to
all other propositions. Also, probabilistic irrelevance is the same thing as independence,
and if I have any epistemic competence at all then my believing p is not independent of
whether p is true or not; why should I treat myself so disrespectfully by following NGI?
Both of these worries are addressed by the proviso. NGI only applies to the subject’s
responses to statements of her degrees of belief when taken by themselves, and if as per
the proviso there are no probability statements she has beliefs about (probabilities for)
except the bare statement that she has degree of belief x in H, then she does not attribute
to her beliefs any relation to the world, incompetent or competent. Thus, following NGI
does not amount to disrespecting oneself epistemically. NGI and RSR are both ways of
remaining neutral about oneself. The difference is the way they handle the risk of inaccu-
racy about one’s belief in H.
On the other hand, when there are probability statements besides P(H) = x that a sub-
ject has beliefs about, NGI does not apply, and nothing says that conditioning on a state-
23 That RSR is a special case of NGI can also be seen by total probability:
P(H) = P(H/P(H) = x)P(P(H) = x) + P(H/P(H) 6¼ x) P(P(H) 6¼ x)
Following RSR the first term on the right hand side becomes x:
P(H) ¼ xP(P(H) = x)þ P(H/P(H) 6¼ x)P(P(H) 6¼ x)
If P(P(H) = x) = 1, that is, the subject is certain that she has degree of belief x, then
P(H) = xð1Þ þ P(H/P(H) 6¼ x)ð0Þ
So it must also be the case that
P(H) = x
That is, she must fulfill Accuracy. However, that leaves several terms in the equation unused. If
the subject follows NGI, then P(H/P(H) = x) = P(H) for all x, so the initial total probability
equation above becomes:
P(H) ¼ P(H)P(P(H) = x)þ P(H)P(P(H) 6¼ x)
The subject following NGI may have Accuracy or not without any sure-loss vulnerability, pro-
vided her confidence that she does not have degree of belief x equals 1 minus her confidence that
she does:
P(H) ¼ P(H)cþ P(H)ð1 c)
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ment of your degree of belief in that kind of case could not change your degree of belief.
The awkward situation described above is a class of cases in which the further assump-
tions 1–4 make the statement of what the subject’s degree of belief is relevant to the proba-
bility of H. Principles for handling such cases have values other than x on the right-hand
side, and so can underwrite changes in first-order degrees of belief on the basis of beliefs
about one’s beliefs by conditionalization, and this is so even if one has an extreme degree
of belief about P(H) = x (Roush 2009). Thus NGI does not force second-order probabili-
ties to be inert.
One will notice that granting failures of ST as rational allows it to be rational for
someone to assert Moorean sentences (both ommissive and commissive) that is, to both
be confident that p and confident that she is not confident of p or confident that p and
not confident that she is confident. This does not imply that the Moorean false step is not
a violation of rationality, but only that probabilistic coherence does not tell us what is
wrong about it. This should not surprise us since coherence is a generalization of deduc-
tive consistency, and most of us do not think that deductive consistency tells us what is
wrong with Moorean sentences either.
4. The broader context: The value of uncertainty about one’s beliefs
The Direct Argument for Self-Transparency failed because of the relevance of possible
worlds in which the subject wins her second-order bet by having in those worlds dif-
ferent first-order degrees of belief from those she actually has. But the subject does not
actually have those degrees of belief, and her having them is only subjectively possi-
ble, possible for all she knows. How could they really matter? They can matter in
ways that make uncertainty about one’s beliefs not only rationally permissible but
advantageous.
They can matter for a combination of reasons. First, that one possesses a degree of
belief in q is a state of the world. Like any state of the world it can have a utility, posi-
tive or negative, and that utility can be independent of the truth value of q. For example
it is often of positive utility to believe that one’s spouse or partner is faithful, whether he
or she is or not. Relationships can be easier and more rewarding if the parties are not
suspicious of each other. For another example, it could be of positive utility for an adver-
tiser for RJ Reynolds to believe that smoking does not cause cancer, since it might help
him sleep better at night.
Second, the bet a subject makes on her belief in q is not the only bet she makes—
often she also bets on q, for example—and, as I will illustrate, the utilities of her bets at
all orders can be weighed together, on the assumption that their units are commensurable.
Third, like any belief, a belief about one’s own belief can be motivating. In particular, as
we will see below, it can motivate us to take actions that affect the outcomes of our first-
order decisions. Finally, though a degree of belief different from your actual one is
merely possible for all you know, this epistemic possibility matters to your decisions
since you cannot base your decisions on reality itself but only on what you believe about
reality. The coin may have already come up heads, but if you have not seen the coin or
been told how it landed, then the possibility that it is tails should play a role in any of
your decisions that depend on that outcome.
The case of implicit bias illustrates these points nicely. Suppose the proposition in
question at the first order is that women are by that fact less competent, call this H.
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We can imagine betting on whether or not one’s degree of belief in H is 0 (one lacks
bias) or greater than 0 (one has bias).24,25 What are the stakes on the bet whether or
not one is biased? We may feel worse about ourselves if it turns out we have this
belief that women are inferior. We may be embarrassed and troubled. We may feel
okay, maybe even proud, if we do not have this belief. The stakes have mainly to do
with our self-regard, except to the extent that our having belief in H leads others to
think we have this belief and they penalize or reward us in consequence. The stakes
on H itself, whether or not women are by that fact less competent, may be much
higher. H is probabilistically relevant to whether Ms. Y or Mr. X is more competent,
and my degrees of belief about X’s and Y’s competence will affect my vote on which
of them gets a job offer. The stakes for me on which candidate is more competent can
be high. A more competent colleague will contribute more to my organization, and so
to my job satisfaction, and I might care intrinsically about hiring the most qualified
person because I care about fairness.
This is a case where beliefs about our beliefs can motivate us to act, or not. For exam-
ple, one could imagine that if one were uncertain whether one had some disposition
toward H one might take measures, such as blinding of applications, to prevent a possible
such inclination from affecting a hiring decision. And suppose that if one were certain
that P(H) = 0, that is, certain that one were unbiased, then one would not take mitigating
measures. After all, one would be certain that there was no reason to do so.
We can see in the following table how things would turn out for a subject with these
options.
Second-order options  
First-order options ↓
P(P(H) = 0) = 1 P(P(H) = 0) < 1
P(H) = 0 (3, 1) (2, -1)
P(H) > 0 (-2, -1) (2, 1)
The table has two dimensions of “choice”26 and every choice and pay-off belongs to
you. Your options at the first order are your beliefs about women, and are listed in the
leftmost column. You are either unbiased, as in the first row of outcomes, or biased, as
in the second row. Your options at the second order are listed in the top row. They are
to be certain that you are unbiased, as in the first column of outcomes, or uncertain that
you are unbiased, as in the second column of outcomes.
24 Having or lacking bias would be more fully represented as gender being probabilistically relevant to
one’s judgments of the competence of individuals rather than as a categorical proposition, but self-knowl-
edge or ignorance of that relevance would be more complicated to represent and unnecessary for the cur-
rent point. I will assume that belief in H leads to gender being probabilistically relevant to one’s
judgments of competence, and non-belief not.
25 Of course, in implicit bias cases there may in addition be flat preferences for, say, men over women that
do their work in decision-making independently of beliefs about competence. These could be added into
the picture. However, to represent implicit bias as involving only a flat preference and no (biased) belief
about competence is not as charitable as I have been since on my picture we allow that the person is
making a choice of candidates on the basis of a judgment about competence—however skewed or
unknown to her—rather than only on a gut preference.
26 Despite the language of choice we need not assume that a subject has voluntary control over her belief
states in order to make use of these tables. They only compare the values or advantages of various com-
binations of states and make no commitment about how you get or got to them.
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For the payoffs, the numbers are arbitrary except for the relations of greater and less.
In the first position in the ordered pair we have the payoff from the first-order options,
the option you take between the two rows, and in the second position of the ordered pair
we have the payoff at the second order, from the option you take between columns,
whether to be certain or uncertain that you are unbiased. The stakes on the second-order
bet, 1 and -1, are taken here to be lower than those on the first-order bet, 3 and -2. For
one who cares more about self-regard and the regard and reaction of others to one’s
beliefs than about hiring the most competent person, that relation would be reversed.
In figuring out the payoffs, we are assuming that H is false—otherwise the belief
would not be a bias. The truth value of H affects your pay-offs because having a bias
will make it more likely you vote for a less competent job candidate than you might
have. In the upper left outcome you are unbiased, so you do as well as you could have
at choosing the most competent candidate, +3, and you were certain that you were
unbiased so you win as much as you could have on the second order bet, +1; this is a
win-win. Below that we have the outcome where you are biased, so you lose some in
your judgment of the competence of job candidates, -2, and you are biased but certain
that you are not, so you lose there too, -1: lose-lose.
In the right column where you are uncertain about your belief, that uncertainty about
whether you are biased made you take mitigation measures. Suppose for simplicity that
those measures were perfectly effective, so whether you are actually biased or not you
do as well as you could have at the first-order, in those judgments of candidates. How-
ever those positive payoffs are smaller than the one on the left, +2 rather than +3,
because mitigation measures are not free, and that reduces your payoff from successfully
choosing the most competent candidate. In the second-order bet the subject uncertain of
whether she is biased loses something in case she is not biased, so she gets a -1 in the
second position in the upper right block. But, in the lower right block the subject uncer-
tain that she’s unbiased wins 1 because indeed she is biased; this block is a win-win.
The subject on the left, who is certain she is unbiased, wins more than in any other
possible outcome if she’s right that she lacks bias. However, she loses more than in any
other outcome if she is wrong about that. If the subject on the right is unbiased then she
wins less than she could have because of the cost of mitigation measures and of being
wrong about her belief, but if she is biased then she still has a win-win. Thus for a per-
son concerned to avoid the worst-case scenario it is better to be uncertain about her
belief, as long as the first-order stakes are higher than the second, with the proviso that if
mitigation measures are costly enough the advantage of uncertainty could be outweighed.
The table looks different if H is true27, but the point here is that it can be advantageous
to be uncertain what one’s degree of belief is, not that it is always advantageous.
Being uncertain of your degree of belief is a violation of the Confidence direction of
Self-Transparency, and we have found not only, above, that there is no good argument in
sight that lack of Confidence brings incoherence, but also, just now, that lack of Confi-
dence can be advantageous. There may not be situations where lack of Accuracy is
advantageous, but many of us do have inaccuracies and the fact, argued earlier, that lack
27 If H is true then the subject who is uncertain about her belief has the greatest potential for gain (a total
of +3), but also the greatest for loss (-4), whereas the subject certain that she is unbiased will either lose
one or gain 2. Thus, whether it is advantageous to be certain or uncertain that one is unbiased depends
on whether H is true, a fact that may lead to paradox or underdetermination.
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of Accuracy about our beliefs does not necessarily bring incoherence, means that as long
as we follow NGI we can mobilize the framework of probabilistic decision theory for
guidance on how to manage the hidden corners of our minds, in the way that I have
illustrated here for failures of Confidence. It is not probabilistically irrational to be igno-
rant about what lies hidden in us, but since this fact makes available the probabilistic
framework for handling the uncertainty it would be irrational not to use it.
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